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Abstract
In this paper, we focus on those policy instruments with monetary incentives that are used to
contain public health expenditure in high-income countries. First, a schematic view of the main
cost-containment methods and the variables in the health system they intend to influence is
presented. Two types of instruments to control the level and growth of public health expenditure
are considered: (i) provider payment methods that influence the price and quantity of health care,
and (ii) cost-containment measures that influence the behaviour of patients. Belonging to the first
type of instruments, we have: fee-for-service, per diem payment, case payment, capitation, salaries
and budgets. The second type of instruments consists of patient charges and reference price
systems for pharmaceuticals. Secondly, we provide an overview of experience in high-income
countries that use or have used these particular instruments. Finally, the paper assesses the overall
potential of these instruments in cost-containment policies.
Introduction
While many low-income developing countries still need
to muster an appropriate and sometimes even a mini-
mum amount of resources, many high-income countries
are addressing the question of how to contain their health
care costs. This question is not brand new, however.
OECD countries already became confronted with this
question some 30 to 40 years ago, when health expendi-
ture grew almost twice as fast as Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). A downward economic cycle in the 1970s as well
as increased ageing of the population enhanced the con-
cern to control health care costs[1].
Cost-containment as a policy issue is related to the ques-
tion what the right amount is that countries should spend
on health care. Society's preferences, and not just econom-
ics, have an important impact on choosing the appropri-
ate amount of care. For example, an increase in the share
of health expenditure in GDP is not just to be understood
as a cost explosion, but could simply be a response to pop-
ulation's preferences for more and better care. This illus-
trates that it will be tedious to establish when cost-
containment is exactly needed.
An additional question is whether cost-containment
should be directed at total expenditure or public expendi-
ture on health. We chose to focus on public expenditure
on health, in view of an overriding and steady concern
about cost-containment by governmental and quasi-gov-
ernmental institutions. As to the need for cost-contain-
ment, few countries use precise criteria that would trigger
cost-containment measures. It seems to be accepted
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though that the aim of cost-containment is to either stabi-
lize public health expenditure per capita or to moderate
the growth rate of public expenditure for health per capita.
It is often taken as evidence of moderation when the latter
growth rate is less than the growth rate of GDP per capita.
Policy makers have resorted to a variety of cost-contain-
ment instruments. First, there are measures impacting
directly upon the supply of health services or the inputs
necessary to ensure this supply. Examples are measures to
control new infrastructure, medical technology and quan-
tities of medical personnel, and to influence the quantity
and structure of health services through treatment proto-
cols and prescribing guidelines and subsequent monitor-
ing of clinical behaviour. Another example is influencing
the supply of ambulatory vs. inpatient care as a result of a
gatekeeper's role for GPs. There are also monetary incen-
tives operating via provider payment mechanisms and
that influence the supply of health services. Examples are
budgets for hospitals and GPs, and other negotiated ways
to pay providers, such as fee-for-services. Secondly, there
are measures on the demand  side of the health sector,
attempting to influence patients' behaviour via non-mon-
etary (e.g. drug information, information on prevention
etc.) and monetary incentives such as patient charges or
user fees.
We recognize that the above-mentioned instruments do
not have cost-containment as a unique objective. The sup-
ply-side measures may also have an impact on health serv-
ices productivity, quality of care, the distribution of
resources, and on shortages and surpluses of human
resources for health. And some of the demand-side meas-
ures may impact upon individuals' access to health care.
However, in this paper, we focus on the cost-containment
potential of these policy tools. In addition, only those pol-
icy tools will be analyzed that incorporate monetary incen-
tives. Policy tools without monetary incentives and that
belong to the areas of information, education and regula-
tion will therefore not be dealt with in this particular
paper. We also summarize the experience in high-income
countries; all of the countries referred to belong to the
OECD or the European Union. In the next section, a sche-
matic view is presented of the cost-containment methods
that will be discussed. In section 2, we analyze the experi-
ence with these policy tools and their effects on cost-con-
tainment. The levels and trends in administrative costs
will be addressed in section 3. Finally in section 4, we pro-
vide a summary table that compares the expected effec-
tiveness of the various tools in terms of cost-containment.
Cost-containment methods: a schematic view
In Figure 1, we present a schematic view of the main cost-
containment methods and the variables in the health sys-
tem they intend to influence. For expository's sake, we
assume that health care is provided in two sectors of the
health system, viz. the ambulatory and inpatient sectors.
Health care refers here to publicly provided care or private
care provided and regulated within the context of a tax-
funded or social health insurance system. Administrative
expenditure is incurred by government and/or social secu-
rity-affiliated institutions while running the health sys-
tem. The grey-filled areas refer to the cost-containment
methods that use monetary incentives. The arrows indi-
cate which variables are influenced by the cost-contain-
ment method. The straight and dotted arrows refer to a
direct and indirect impact on the variables, respectively.
A  first  way to control the level and growth of health
expenditure is via provider payment methods. Providers can
be general practitioners, specialists, hospital managers etc.
These methods influence the price of health care in a
direct way, and may impact upon the quantity of care sup-
plied by providers in an indirect way. Indeed, providers
may react to the incentives imbedded in the provider pay-
ment method selected, and change the pattern and vol-
ume of care. In the first circle at the top of the figure, we
mention fee-for-services (FFS), case payment, salaries for
providers and per diem payment (although the latter is
almost used exclusively for inpatient care). In the second
circle at the top of the figure, the capitation payment
method is mentioned. It fixes the amount that providers
can spend per person entitled to the ambulatory and inpa-
tient services. The third circle at the top of the figure refers
to the sectoral budget, whereby health spending by sector
is capped. In the second circle at the bottom of the figure,
we refer to budget caps on administrative costs. The circle
to the right at the bottom of the figure refers to the global
budget that caps overall health spending.
Secondly, there are cost-containment instruments that
intend to influence the behaviour of patients via patient or
user charges, including co-insurance and co-payments.
These instruments are intended to impact upon the quan-
tity and type of initial contacts with the health system that
patients make in case of need. To a certain extent, they
may also influence the volume of referral health care. Ref-
erence pricing systems for drugs are also used to encour-
age patients to substitute to lower priced drugs. Both
reference pricing and patient charges are referred to in the
circle at the left towards the middle of the figure.
For completeness' sake, other demand and supply-side
cost-containment measures are referred to in the white cir-
cle towards the middle of the page. These may influence
the quantities of care. They may also affect the relative size
of patient numbers in the different health sectors. For
instance, gatekeeping regulation may impact upon the
number of inpatients. As announced earlier, these otherHuman Resources for Health 2003, 1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/1/1/6
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Overview of cost-containment methods Figure 1
Overview of cost-containment methods
                           *                             =                              *                            =
                +
                           *        =*                 =                             *                             =
                +
                     
                         
Price
ambulatory
care
Quantity
ambulatory
 care
Health exp.
p.cap.  in
ambul. care
Population
entitled to 
ambul.care
Health expenditure in
ambulatory care
Price
inpatient
care
Quantity
inpatient
care
Health exp.
p.cap in
inpat. care
Population
entitled to
inpat. care
Health expenditure in
inpatient care
 FFS
 Per diem
 Salaries
  Case payment
Total health spending
Capitation Sectoral budget
Global  budget
 Patient charges
 Reference
pricing
Other demand-side
and supply-side
measures
Administrative
expenditure
      Budget capsHuman Resources for Health 2003, 1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/1/1/6
Page 4 of 10
(page number not for citation purposes)
cost-containment measures will not be dealt with in this
technical paper.
The overview of cost-containment methods and their
impacts does not tell us, however, how successful these
are. In addition, cost-containment objectives may not be
totally realized, as a result of behaviour of providers or
patients that counteract the intended effects. The purpose
of the next section is precisely to provide a greater insight
into the potential of cost-containment methods intended
to influence both provider and patient behaviour. In par-
ticular, we review of the empirical literature concerning
the use of such methods in high-income countries.
Administrative costs will be addressed later.
Policy tools with monetary incentives for cost-
containment: a brief overview of experience in high-
income countries
Provider payment mechanisms: monetary incentives directed at 
providers
Fee-for-service (FFS) schedules for both ambulatory care
services and inpatient care are used in many systems, espe-
cially the social health insurance-based schemes that
reimburse patients for costs incurred. Also in mixed sys-
tems like the U.S., the government regulated Medicare sys-
tem for the elderly and disabled uses a resource based
relative value scale [2] (RBRVS) for the payment of physi-
cian services. It has in common with other fee schedules
that it takes account of criteria like time input and skill
needed for producing the various health services.
One can expect that application of fee schedules entails
important administrative costs, in view of the resources
needed for billing, reimbursement of fees, monitoring
and possible adjustment of the schedule. There is also the
fear that fees create incentives to systematically produce
more health services than necessary. One example is from
Copenhagen (Denmark) where, in 1987, payment of
General practitioners (GPs) changed from a fully capi-
tated payment to a payment that was partly based on fees;
the provision of those services that generated extra fees
increased significantly [3]. An earlier review on physi-
cians' financial incentives in the U.S. also confirms that
production of health services is systematically higher
when fees are used to pay providers, as compared to pro-
viders that face incentives aiming at controlling treatment
and resource use [2].
Another study on differences in health services among
349 physicians found that, after adjusting for patient mix,
practices with FFS as the provider payment method had
41% more hospitalisations than health maintenance
organisations using prepayment [4]. We also refer to a
study on the determinants of health expenditure in OECD
countries. It was found that in countries with FFS payment
for physicians, the ratio of physicians per population was
positively related to health expenditure [5]. One interpre-
tation is that the possible reduction in average physician
income resulting from a greater availability of physicians,
seems to be offset via increased health services, at least in
a fee-for-service environment.
In a number of circumstances, however, the initial effect
of fees on resource use and expenditure can be counter-
acted. The Japanese social health insurance scheme uses a
national fee schedule as one of its key cost-containment
instruments. Nearly all procedures and services are subject
to this schedule which is applied on a nation-wide basis.
Since 1981, the regular revision of the fee schedule has led
to relatively low fee levels. In 1995, fees were about one
quarter of the Medicare RBRVS fee schedule [6]. It has also
led to a relatively modest ratio of health care costs to gross
domestic product, namely 7.4% in 1997 [7]. It is impor-
tant to note that the overall level of fees in the Japanese
system is in fact linked to a kind of overall global budget
which is negotiated between the Ministry of Finance and
the Ministry of Health and Welfare. With the global
budget being capped, selective fee reductions have
become logical [8]. The system has also allowed for 'bun-
dling' of fees, with fees becoming flat when a predeter-
mined quantity of services is exceeded. The latter is
applied in the case of laboratory tests, for example.
In other social health insurance schemes, explicit budget
caps for providers have also been established. Some social
health insurance schemes have used this cost-contain-
ment method. When Germany used the budget ceiling
approach, for example, excessive increases in physicians'
services did lead to a proportionate reduction in the level
of fees [9]. In Belgium, targets are also set for health insur-
ance expenditure; in 1996 the health insurance budget
was overrun and Government reduced the fees by 3 per
cent [10]. In the Canadian universal Medicare system, fee
schedules are also combined with provincial expenditure
caps. In the past across-the-board percentage reduction of
fees were observed when these caps were exceeded [11]. In
such an environment, doctors are tempted to engage in
extra-billing. This has prompted the Canada Health Act of
1984 to stipulate that federal government transfers for
health to provinces would be reduced, in the event a prov-
ince would allow doctors to bill extra charges [12].
Daily payment or per diem payment of hospital services
has been used frequently in the past, when funding was
still largely open-ended and retrospective. It has been tra-
ditionally associated with weak capacity for cost-contain-
ment, as it creates incentives to expand length of stay and/
or increase the number of admissions. In order to avoid
the effects of such incentives, new ways of prospective
payment were designed, among which the case payment.Human Resources for Health 2003, 1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/1/1/6
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Still, a number of countries including Belgium [13] con-
tinue to use per diem payments but subject to budget lim-
its. Also in Japan, the biennial fee schedule revisions allow
for strict control of hospitalization fees. For instance, in
order to stimulate hospitals to shorten average length-of-
stay, basic hospitalization fees have been progressively
reduced, the per diem rate after ninety days being less than
half that of the first fourteen days [37].
Case payment can be used both in ambulatory and inpa-
tient care sector. An example in the former sector is a flat
payment per consultation, whatever its nature. Admit-
tedly, there is a similarity with the FFS system. However,
in the latter system, the fee schedule is usually more com-
plex and fees vary substantially according to criteria such
as length of the consultation, purpose etc. In inpatient
care, the best example is the Diagnosis Related Group
(DRG) payment method, with hospitals being paid an
inclusive flat sum for a patient's treatment according to
her diagnostic group. DRGs are used in the USA's Medi-
care programme for the old aged. DRGs are also used in
setting part or the whole of the hospital budget in Austria,
Ireland, Finland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden [9].
Case payments such as DRGs are expected to be a good
cost-containment device, as hospitals need to provide
services within the overall constraint of the flat payment
schedule. Evidence on the potential for cost-containment
of DRGs is mixed, however. DRGs seem to have resulted
in an important decrease in the growth rate of the cost of
the U.S. Medicare programme [14]. In Germany, adoption
of DRGs in 1993 as an alternative to per diem payment
led to both a decrease in the length of stay and a rise in the
hospital admissions, resulting in a rise in the number of
hospital days per 1000 population. As a result, the rate of
increase of hospital costs hardly changed [15].
DRGs may also impact in an indirect way upon the non-
hospital sectors. In fact, the net effect of DRGs on total
health care costs may well be small, as cost-shifting may
take place between the different sectors. In the US, the
DRG payment system appeared to have stimulated hospi-
tals to shift patients and costs to outpatient care and long-
term care facilities [16,17]. Finally, it should be stated
that, especially for European countries and Australia,
DRGs have been used less as a cost-containment device
than as a method to establish case-mix adjusted global
hospital budgets.
Capitation payment is a mechanism whereby providers,
whether they are GPs or hospitals, receive a flat payment
per individual that is covered by a National Health Service
system, a social health insurance scheme, or by private
health insurance. In return for this flat payment, patients
are entitled to services of a pre-defined benefit package.
Capitation payments in outpatient care are used in quite
a number of European countries (including Austria, Den-
mark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands
and the UK). Capitation payments are not necessarily uni-
form and can be adjusted for health risks, including old
age. In addition, they may be combined with FFS for spe-
cial services such as in Denmark, Italy and the UK. In the
US, capitation payments are pervasive in both outpatient
and inpatient care, especially within the framework of
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) or managed
care plans.
The major characteristic of this payment method is that
there is no direct link between the capitation payment and
the cost of the health services consumed by an individual
patient; in other words, providers are not paid according
to the quantity and mix of health services given to that
individual. Hence, the incentive to provide excessive
health services that other payment methods (such as the
FFS and the case payment method) might have, disap-
pears. Instead, there is clearly the incentive to provide less
costly treatment. In Finland, where capitation is used in
about half of the primary health care centres, outpatient
contacts per person are among the lowest in the European
Union. The latter phenomenon may be due in part to the
capitation system [18]. In the U.S. one study [19] found
that capitation for comprehensive health services had led
to 40% fewer inpatient admissions in comparison with
FFS systems. In addition, length of stay fell from 5.9 days
in 1985 to 3.75 days in 1993. And in the study on health
expenditure in OECD countries, referred to earlier, coun-
tries that use capitation to reimburse their physicians have
lower health spending [5].
When capitation is linked to one category of care only,
such as outpatient care, there may be an incentive, how-
ever, to underprovide or to refer unnecessarily to higher
echelons in the health system. In Hungary, for example, it
was found that the referral rate of family physicians that
received capitated payments was much higher than in the
case of salaried physicians. It is then uncertain what the
net impact of capitation on total health care costs will be.
In the US, there is debate on whether managed care plans
with capitation have been more efficient in controlling
costs than other payment methods. Some studies found
that HMOs reduced hospital expenditures [20]. Critics
[21] have retorted that one should look beyond hospital
expenditure though. Their argument is that managed care
plans have been known to engage in cost-shifting and in
raising administrative costs, so that HMOs do not neces-
sarily reduce or contain total health care spending.
Salaries for doctors are used as a payment method in sev-
eral OECD countries, including Greece (National Health
Service doctors), Spain (60% of doctors have an incomeHuman Resources for Health 2003, 1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/1/1/6
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that is based on a salary plus a capitation amount), Portu-
gal, Finland and Sweden [9]. Several advantages are
advanced: (i) there is no longer an economic incentive to
over-provide services, certainly compared to FFS payment;
(ii) salaried doctors have an incentive to engage in group
consultation, especially in the event of complex cases; (iii)
financial planning of health care services becomes easier
and administrative costs become lower, as compared to
other payment methods, especially FFS.
Disadvantages of a salary system in the public sector are
also noted: (i) a salary system reduces incentives for doc-
tors to work productively; (ii) it may lead to low morale
for those who work hard but feel they are not rewarded for
the extra efforts; (iii) it may then incite the latter to take
up work in the private sector, or leave the public sector
altogether. Related to the salary payment system as a cost-
containment tool, it was found that salary payments are
generally associated with lower levels of care [22]. The lat-
ter is not unexpected, when comparing the salary method
to capitation. Indeed, in order for doctors paid under cap-
itation to increase income, they need to attract more
patients. They could do so by offering more services (such
as tests or drug prescriptions) speculating thereby that
patients would perceive this as high quality care. It is also
expected for salaried doctors to offer fewer services than
when they would be paid via FFS. In fact, they may even
want to minimize their efforts by minimizing the number
of patients they see.
Budgets  for public health expenditure have been used
since a long time in countries with national health sys-
tems, such as the UK, Ireland and Denmark. Most levels of
the health system in these countries are subject to such
budgets. In Denmark, an overall global health budget is
negotiated annually and fixed by central and local govern-
ments. These budgets are also fixed or 'hard' so that over-
runs are as good as impossible. Systems that use such
budgets are often referred to as closed-end  systems as
opposed to open-ended financing systems [23].
In other European countries, budgets became increasingly
popular since the mid-1980s, as a response to large cost
increases in the health sector. Two forms of budget setting
are seen: global budgets that, in principle, cover the totality
of health care costs and sectoral budgets that are set for spe-
cific sectors of the health system. Three further remarks are
in order. First, many budgets are rather established as 'tar-
gets' and can be exceeded if needed. That is why they are
often referred to as 'soft'. In fact, global budgets proved be
mostly soft  rather than hard. For instance, in 1994 the
Government of Belgium established a limit on the real
growth of public health expenditure of 1.5 per cent; the
limit was respected in 1994 and 1995, but in the two fol-
lowing years, the real growth of the public health expend-
iture budget exceeded the limit that was set earlier.
Secondly, one has seen a mix of hard and soft sectoral
budgets at country level. For example, in France, there are
fixed hospital budgets for hospitals whereas there are tar-
get budgets for pharmaceuticals, clinical biology, nursing
services and office-based doctors. Thirdly, it needs to be
verified which costs would not be included in the global
budget. In Belgium, for example, administrative costs are
excluded from the annual global budgets for health care.
One understands that when budgets are soft, there is
hardly a guarantee for success in cost-containment. But
even when budgets happen to be hard, they do not auto-
matically lead to cost reductions or lower health expendi-
ture growth rates. They may also be based on historical
costs and therefore incorporate important inefficiencies.
In the above mentioned OECD inter-country study, for
instance, no evidence was found that budget caps for
ambulatory and inpatient care lowered total health
expenditure [5]. Apart from cost-inefficiencies, other
problems have been noted. In France, for example, hard
hospital budgets were thought to discourage the adoption
of new technologies and to encourage cream skimming.
Also in Germany, cream skimming and waiting lists
appeared, which has stimulated the abolition of the secto-
ral hospital budgets [9].
Still when budgets are hard and therefore enforceable, it is
possible to contain the expansion of health care costs.
When researchers [24] examined inpatient expenditure
trends in France between 1960 and 1990, it was con-
cluded that sectoral budgets had been successful in reduc-
ing the volume of hospital care. As a result, overall
expenditure growth was slowed down. In Ireland, tighter
budgetary allocations for the hospital sector were thought
to have contributed to the important reduction (28%) in
the length of stay in hospitals between 1980 and 1993. In
Germany budgetary restrictions in January 1993 included
a cap on costs of drugs prescribed by office-based physi-
cians; excessive prescribing would result automatically in
clawing back the excess from physicians. The number of
prescriptions decreased from 795 million in 1992 to 712
million in 1993, with drug expenditure being 25% lower
than in 1992 [25]. Prescriptions seem to have increased
again after 1993, but there is still the claim that this policy
measure led to savings of about 10% of the total budget
for pharmaceuticals. It is important to bear in mind, how-
ever, that a sectoral budget policy may impact on other
sub-sectors of the health system. For instance, there was
evidence that office-based physicians increased referrals to
specialists and hospitals, subsequent to the drug budget
policy. This 'substitution' cost has reduced the amount of
'net' global savings in the health sector that was finally
realized [26].Human Resources for Health 2003, 1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/1/1/6
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Policy tools with monetary incentives directed at patients
Patient charges or user fees are widely used in health sys-
tems with the intention to moderate demand of health
care. In social health insurance systems, they usually take
the form of co-insurance (a fraction of the cost of a health
service that is paid by the insured). For example, co-insur-
ance for GP and specialist care can be as high as 30%, such
as in France and Luxembourg. And in the case of prescrip-
tion drugs, co-insurance schedules exist, with co-insur-
ance rates that are lower, the greater the therapeutic and
social value of the prescription drug. These systems also
use co-payments (a specified charge for a specified health
service), such as for pharmaceuticals and inpatient care in
Austria. In tax-funded health systems, cost-sharing
through co-payments is also practised. In Sweden, co-pay-
ments exist for outpatient care, including dental care,
inpatient care and pharmaceuticals. And in the UK, user
fees have been introduced for pharmaceutical, dental and
ophthalmic health services, as well as for amenity beds
[27] in the hospital sector.
From an equity point of view, the use of patient charges
ought to be minimal. Access to care may be hampered,
certainly among the low-income households. Patient
charges on such households may also impact on health.
For instance, it was found in the Rand Health Insurance
Experiment in the U.S. that low-income patients that were
exempted from charges had notable improvements in vis-
ual acuity and critical reductions in blood pressure, when
compared with non-exempt patients [28]. Recognizing
the threats of a negative impact of patient charges on
access and health status, exemptions or reduced patient
charges were introduced in most systems. More recently,
ceilings for patient charges have been introduced in sev-
eral countries, including Sweden [29], Germany, Belgium,
Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands, in order to protect
low-income households.
From a cost-containment point of view, patient charges
hardly constitute a panacea. For a broad range of health
services, patient charges on health services surely tend to
decrease their utilisation, but do so rather modestly. To
give a quantitative idea about this relatively low impact, it
is not uncommon to find [30] that a one percentage
increase in patient charges tends to lead to a reduction in
utilisation of merely 0.2%.
This downward pressure on utilisation does not imply,
however, that overall expenditure would simply drop. In
fact, the opposite may occur. It can be shown that, in the
context of rising unit costs of health services, increased
patient charges and a weak impact of patient charges on
health care consumption, total health spending can rise.
Cost-reduction is certainly not automatically achieved via
patient charges. Admittedly, some degree of cost-contain-
ment is achieved, as final health spending is likely to be
less compared to health spending in a situation where
patient charges are absent.
One also needs to look beyond the impact on health serv-
ices that are specifically targeted by a cost-containment
policy. Indeed, an additional effect of patient charges will
be the tendency of patients to substitute the services that
are subject to patient charges for other types of care. For
instance, additional patient charges on specialist care may
incite patients to demand more GP care than before. In
that case, the overall net cost-containment effect may be
lower than anticipated. In New Hampshire (US), a policy
was introduced to limit reimbursement to three drug pre-
scriptions a month for patients with a major psychiatric
illness. The use of psychotropic drugs surely dropped, but
at the same time demand for the services of mental health
centres and hospitals increased. It was estimated that this
policy finally resulted in a cost that was 17 times more
than it saved [31,38].
Whatever the degree of cost-containment, it is sure that an
increase inpatient charges results in a shifting of health
care costs to individual patients, which is a move away
from risk-sharing across all population groups.
Reference price systems for pharmaceuticals are a rela-
tively new cost-containment method and has been intro-
duced since the late eighties. Basically, a cluster of similar
drugs is associated with one specific price accepted by gov-
ernment for reimbursement purposes. Should a physician
prescribe a drug priced above this 'reference' price, it is the
patient who will pay the difference. This policy is meant
to increase the cost-consciousness of patients and to incite
them to demand reference priced drugs. New Zealand was
the first to introduce reference pricing, to be followed in
Europe by Germany (1989), and then the Netherlands
(1991), Denmark and Sweden (1993), and Italy (1996)
[9]. Little information is available on patients' behaviour
with regard to these systems.
At a macroeconomic level, however, reference price sys-
tems do not appear to have been successful. This is
because reference price systems apply to interchangeable
drugs only. New and innovative drugs are therefore not
likely to be covered by these systems, and escape price
control. In the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden,
growth of the sales of products that were not covered by
the reference price system, easily outweighed the cost-sav-
ings generated by prescribing reference-priced drugs [9].
Levels and trends in administrative costs
Administrative costs are defined here as the public part of
the costs of health administration and social insurance at
all levels of government. Included in these costs are costsHuman Resources for Health 2003, 1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/1/1/6
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as a result of planning, management, regulation, and col-
lection of funds and handling of claims of the delivery sys-
tem [32]. Obviously, these costs can in principle also be
targeted for cost-containment. It is important to consider
these as well, since excessive administrative costs entail
considerable opportunity costs: funds that are spent
unwisely can not be spent on health care itself, an exten-
sion of the benefit package, an expansion of population
coverage etc.
An earlier comparative analysis of administrative costs in
a sample of OECD countries showed that in 1990 public
administrative expenditures as a percentage of total public
expenditure on health varied from 0.2% to 7.1% [33]. It
was noted in this analysis that insurance-based systems
tend to be relatively more expensive than general revenue
based systems. More recent data (from 1990 to 1999) for
a sample of OECD countries have confirmed this finding,
the mean share of administrative costs in health spending
being 2.2% and 4.2% for general revenue-based an insur-
ance-based systems, respectively. We thus find that 'on
average' the insurance-based systems spend proportion-
ally more administrative resources than in the tax-based
systems. This divergence is not absolute, however. Note
for example that in 1998, Japan devoted a modest 2% of
its health spending to administration of its social health
insurance system. The latter result can be explained to a
large extent by the presence of one 'Social Insurance Med-
ical Care Fee Payment Fund' [34] where the totality of
claims and reimbursements is processed, as opposed to
systems whereby different pools or funds are involved in
such payments and therefore are each confronted with
additional administrative costs.
It has been mentioned that a lack of harmonized data may
make comparisons difficult. For example, the data for
France appear to be incomplete, as they cover the costs of
the government health administration only, and not
those of the social security institutions. But even after
improving on the data comparability, an important
degree of dispersion between the two types of health
financing systems is likely to remain. Still, a comparison
of the levels of shares administrative cost in total spending
is not straightforward because, in principle, one ought to
take account of the differences in the 'products' supplied
by the administration. Differences in administrative costs
are not only due to the amount of transactions such as
claims processing in insurance schemes. They may also be
due to differences in the variety of information services to
patients (e.g. about benefit entitlements, health informa-
tion), and in the degree to which the administration is
involved in monitoring the quality of health services, in
efforts to contain spending and in data-processing of clin-
ical and financial information. We recognize that the
explanation of differences in administrative costs would
merit further attention. This is beyond the scope of the
present technical paper, however.
We propose now to look into the trends of administrative
expenditure as a share of total public health expenditure.
It is interesting to observe that these shares, whether from
insurance based or tax based health systems, were subject
to a negative yearly trend of -0.1% over the last decade. A
reduction over time of the shares of administrative costs is
not unexpected. In tax-based systems where national and/
or district administrative bodies have the responsibility to
finance health care for target population groups, economies
of scale in administration are likely to arise. Likewise, in
the case of insurance-based schemes, average costs of
administration tend to drop with an increasing number of
patient claims; in other words, there are usually econo-
mies of scale in processing of claims. In the U.S. for exam-
ple, evidence was reported on the existence of economies
of scale in the non-profit Blue Shield health insurance
plans. It was also estimated, for the year 1976, that these
plans could minimize average administrative cost when
processing 17.7 million claims per year [35]. Another rea-
son for a downward trend is the increasingly efficient way
of handling administrative tasks as a result of technologi-
cal advances such as computerization of billing, settling
claims and records [33]. In France for example, a smart
card or 'carte vitale' was introduced in 1999 [36], which
significantly facilitates access to care and reimbursement
operations. Improvements in technology and subsequent
productivity have also permitted a reduction in adminis-
trative labour costs: sickness funds reduced their number
of employees by 5 percent between 1980 and 1990. In
other countries with an insurance-based system, measures
were introduced to limit administrative spending of
health insurance funds.
Policy tools with monetary incentives also exist, however.
We refer especially to budget caps on administrative
resources managed by various administrative units in the
health system. In Belgium, for example, capped budgets
for administration are established for its seven health
insurance funds; a typical budget consists of a fixed part,
which is granted unconditionally, and a variable part
which depends on performance of the fund. Note that for
the year 2002, the estimated share of these funds' admin-
istrative costs in total reimbursements is estimated to be
4.63%. Empirical evidence in the other OECD countries
about the effects of specific measures introduced to con-
tain administrative costs is not readily available, however.
The potential role of the policy instruments in cost-
containment: a summary
In Table 1, we summarize the potential role of the various
instruments intended to contain health care costs, based
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comments are provided in the Table as well, referring to
possible pitfalls or circumstances where the expected
impact on cost-containment can be reduced or
neutralized. Methods to contain administrative costs are
not summarized in Table 1, because of weak empirical evi-
dence on the effects of specific cost-containment meth-
ods. Budget caps on administrative costs along with the
application of technological advances are likely to be
good instruments for cost-containment. However, more
international evidence needs to be generated before arriv-
ing at generally applicable lessons.
Related to measures that impact upon the supply of health
services, we offer the following conclusions. One first
message from Table 1 is that salaries and budgets do in
principle have a high cost-containment potential. There
are two caveats, however. One is that while salaries may
affect an important fraction of health care costs, there is
no certainty that costs of other inputs are contained. Sec-
ondly, budgets may be of the soft kind. Or, budgets are
being used but permit sizeable growth of health care costs.
A second message is that case payment and capitation do
have some cost-containment potential. There is an impor-
tant risk of shifting of costs to other sub-sectors, however.
Thirdly, fee-for-services and per diem payments usually
do not have a cost-containment potential. They can even
stimulate costs. An important caveat, however, is that a
potentially negative effect on cost-containment can be
counteracted if hard budgets are put in place.
Concerning measures directed at the demand  of health
services, we submit, first, that patient charges do not
appear to be a successful cost-containment tool, as
patients' sensitivity to such charges is usually quite mod-
est. Apart from the expected modest impact on cost-con-
tainment, there is also the adverse impact of patient
charges on equity in access, which is of special concern to
low-income households. Secondly, a reference price system
may also contribute to cost-containment, but the degree
of success depends on whether prescribing of drugs out-
side the reference price system remains important.
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